ABSTRACT
Shaftesbury enters our picture in Chapter Two with Bentham’s presumption in mind that he championed a ‘moral sense’ as opposed to a utilitarian ethics. Mill viewed Shaftesbury in the same light. Some later commentators also imply that Shaftesbury opposed the general utility doctrine relying on an innate ‘sense of right and wrong’. There may be some justification for such a reading, but I show that when engaged in practical application Shaftesbury considers the moral sense as recommending to the individual conscious concern with the public welfare – reflecting his perception of ‘virtue’ – as Locke had already established, as Hutcheson and Hume were later to do, and consistently with Mill’s notion of ‘general utility as the foundation of morality’. Furthermore, Shaftesbury emphasized that ‘Virtue and Interest may be found at last to agree’, drawing on an argument from ‘reason’ whereby private advantage harmonizes with the public good, namely the individual’s realization of his dependency on society which encourages him to be concerned for its welfare. This is fully in line with Locke. These features will surprise readers impressed by Shaftesbury’s neglect of Locke in his printed writings and positive hostility expressed in private correspondence.
