ABSTRACT
Since the USSR regards its aerospace industry as a prime defence asset, it is scarcely surprising that information on its size, organisation and capability is difficult to obtain. One aerospace authority laments the fact that, despite years of endeavour, he is still unable to discern such basic operational concerns as the manner in which prototype aircraft are evaluated, the rationale for the allocation of particular aircraft models to certain production plants, and the means whereby financial returns are assessed in order to infer varying rates of efficiency among the aerospace factories. In light of such a state of affairs, any review of the aerospace sector in the Soviet bloc must remain both sketchy and tentative. What is clear, however, is that the industry operates in tandem with national targets in the military and civil fields and, consequently, escapes much of the uncertainty that plagues Western aerospace. Indeed, there is no element of uncertainty in production runs of aircraft once the technical hurdles of design have been overcome. Furthermore, since 1959 there has been a division of labour imposed throughout the bloc: Poland is assigned the GA functions for the entire COMECON system, Czechoslovakia concentrates on jet trainer and some STOL transport functions, while Romania fulfils the primary trainer requirements (and other things besides). Of course, the USSR maintains an aerospace capability across the spectrum of aeronautical and space activities, even to the extent of furnishing much of the R & D and material inputs of the projects delegated to the Eastern European "satellite" industries.
