ABSTRACT
We begin with the proposition that, contrary to generally accepted semiotic enquiry, pragmatics, usually downgraded to a secondary category, should be seen as the primary focus, and that semantic and syntactic analyses are inventions generated through pragmatics, especially in the social sciences. Arguments for pragmatics: (1) semantic/syntactic structures and universal grammar rules allegedly governing overt behaviour are accessed through instances of language usage (pragmatics); (2) no mechanism is offered to explain how these hidden structures control actions; they are just widely held assumptions; (3) usage of language and other cultural texts frequently changes, but the underlying rules controlling texts would need to change first for them to control the changes in the texts. Observations for pragmatics: (1) scientific theory should explain and predict; semantics and syntactics just describe events and behaviour post factum (e.g. games, language); (2) no methods of proof are offered to distinguish between invention and discovery, just highly elaborate, unresolvable descriptions. We promise deflation, not inflation; (3) only pragmatics can predict how you will read and interpret a text. Following Wittgenstein, the meaning of a word is the way it is used. Shared social practices, including language, are articulated as rules to explain or prescribe a practice.
