ABSTRACT
The self-defense justification is only applicable to the justification of acts directed against ongoing or imminent attacks. The necessity or lesser evil justification, in contrast, can justify a variety of things that would normally be prohibited. This chapter first explains the basic idea and the basic elements of emergency justifications. An important point is that the necessity condition and the proportionality condition cannot be separated as neatly here as in the case of self-defense. It then further distinguishes different kinds of emergency justifications and describes in more detail how they work. Particular emphasis will be placed on the controversial topic as to how the concept of “danger” or “threat” has to be interpreted. It will be argued that neither a purely subjectivist nor a purely objectivist interpretation of “danger” can work. Accordingly, plausible accounts of emergency justifications must be mixed, but the mix takes on a different form here than in the case of the self-defense justification. Finally, the chapter refutes Helen Frowe’s recent claim that the lesser evil justification amounts to an obligation, as well as her renewed claim that agents on whom the lesser harm would justifiably be inflicted may not defend themselves against it.
