ABSTRACT
The chapter examines the structures and processes in intergovernmental or centre–state relations in federations in Asia. The relations are the operative part of federalism. While there is a constitutionally mandated distribution of powers and responsibilities for each tier of government in federations, the actual operations may take different forms. Beyond the constitutional structure, there are factors such as the party system, leadership, fragmented society etc. which factor into whether the relations are to be cooperative, conflictual or both. Democracy is the silver lining in centre–state relations, for it alone provides the scope for dialogue. But often democracy can be an irritant for smooth federal-provincial relations when the federation is held hostage by some recalcitrant forces. A federation may be very centralized and authoritarian, in which case the federal units are dependent on the centre’s whims for disbursement. Structurally, Myanmar and Malaysia are centralized, but federalism there does not work. In India, constitutionally, the Union government is very powerful, but then administratively it is decentralized. The Finance Commission here has followed a particular formula in financial disbursement to the states which has ensured a good balance in centre–state relations. Finally, this chapter highlights the new role of the federal units in the wake of implementing neoliberal reforms.
