ABSTRACT
This chapter explores the compatibility of Kaleckian themes with the two dominant strains of theories of the firm. A general feature of contractual approaches is that to replicate and re-impose efficient allocation and distribution is prohibitively costly and differential if it can be done at all. We take this to mean that the paradigm has necessarily and irrevocably shifted from one of efficiency-competition to one of efficiency-conflict. Efficiency in the firm is insufficient for continued existence qua survival. Despite the usual proposed affinity with resource-based accounts, the similarities are limited given the limited emphasis on the nature of the environment. Rather, there are strong parallels with the property rights approach, which covers similar terrain to Kalecki’s approach. Both place ownership and finance at the centre of the analysis. Who owns private property is fundamental to the account since ownership confers power under contractual incompleteness. Ownership then codes automatic mechanisms to exercise power.
