ABSTRACT
Immanuel Kant uses the terms Herrschergewalt and Souveranitat to define sovereignty as something primarily linked to legislative authority. If one substitutes H. Kelsen’s ‘psychological’ character for self-coercion with a properly Kantian ‘morally’ motivating character of the law, then it becomes possible to understand why for Kant compliance with international law requirements is in need of a ‘constitutional mindset’. Kant’s regulative function for the multistate confederation offers, therefore, a precise understanding of the validity of institutional decision making and adjudication. As S. Byrd and H. Hruschka observe, Kant’s move from a state of nature to a juridical condition first requires the postulation of a form of iustitia commutativa – the type of justice connected to the public market as a realm of free interactions – something also realizable outside of a statehood framework.
