ABSTRACT
Analysis, the ‘thinking part’ of the process whereby information is transformed into finished intelligence, is a key part of the intelligence cycle. Many of the Joint Intelligence Committee’s assessments of Soviet Cold War intentions were guesswork based on speeches, the number of Soviet Bloc tanks and economic information, given the absence of hard intelligence on policy from inside the Kremlin. Intelligence reports can take two forms: short-term and long-term assessments. Indian intelligence officers deceived themselves into thinking an intrusion was unlikely because, in their view, it was irrational and went against the growing detente between India and Pakistan. Analysts recruited from ‘Ivy League’ universities –a traditional recruiting ground for the United States intelligence community–may think and act the same way, undermining the ability to ‘think outside of the box’. In democracies too, analysts may find themselves pressured into distorting intelligence to fit a policymaker’s political agenda. The Israeli intelligence community was taken completely by surprise by Egyptian and Syrian forces.
