ABSTRACT

The chapter begins with a description in very abstract terms what sorts of basic axiological commitments are involved in being a utopian about politics—in believing, that is, that some political goods can only be adequately conceptualized via a broader conception of the ideal human society. Special attention is also given to two more recent, idiosyncratic defenses of utopianism that make explicit appeal to the opportunities offered by digital media: Jane McGonigal’s apologia for the cultural benefits of gamification and Peter Ludlow’s crypto-anarchism. A brief survey then follows of some of the most familiar types of anti-utopianism from throughout the history of philosophy, as defended by authors such as Edmund Burke, Isaiah Berlin, Karl Popper, and John Gray. All these authors’ arguments turn out to reliably miss their target whenever it is the case that the specific political actions the utopian recommends can be understood as directed toward the beneficent, public provision of simulated experience.