ABSTRACT
The discussion start with a general overview of world fisheries. It then goes on to describe various institutional rules governing fishery use and management. The discussion then turns to a development of the standard fisheries model, which is a model that combines natural fishery growth dynamics with economic behavior by fishers in order to derive fish population and fish harvesting equilibria. This model can also be used to analyze different property rights regimes, especially closed access and open access regimes. With the fisheries model under our belts, the discussion then turns to traditional fishery policy prescriptions, especially catch limits and regulations of various kinds. These can be understood well using the fisheries model. The discussion then turns to a property rights perspective on fisheries policy with an examination of transferable property rights under the individual transferable quota (ITQ) system. The success of ITQ systems is shown to depend very much on the magnitude of transaction costs, and the sources of transaction costs are discussed. The discussion then turns to local fisheries management, applying the SES framework to first characterize the situation with many fisheries as being subject to the roving bandits problem. It then provides a sharp contrast by discussing a prominent example of success in fisheries management: lobster fishing in Maine. This discussion provides a natural way to apply the SES framework in order to gain more insights in the factors that lead to fishery management success. The chapter concludes with a discussion of public choice regarding fisheries policy, in the context of fisheries management in the United States.
