ABSTRACT
Chapter 4 analyzes foreign anti-bribery legislation, primarily the OECD Convention and the national laws of the US, and where necessary of other enforcement actors, such as the UK and Germany. This is done from the perspective of collective action, focusing on legal norms determining the provision of enforcement, legal mechanisms that incentivize cooperation and coordination between national enforcement authorities, and legal ambiguities that may cause cooperation and coordination problems. The chapter argues that the substantive standard introduced by the OECD Convention sets a good basis for prosecuting many MNCs for bribing. However, the key problem is how to deal with certain clarity challenges, such as which authority should enforce foreign anti-bribery laws and how enforcement authorities should cooperate and coordinate with each other. The investigation in this chapter adopts a more formalistic approach that is further expanded by an in-depth case study in Chapters 5 and 6.
