ABSTRACT
Chapter 7 applies the collective action framework (presented in Chapter 2) and explains in what way, and to what extent, extraterritoriality is effective in solving enforcement difficulties of the OECD anti-bribery enforcement regime. This is important because international extraterritorial regimes should achieve their intended objectives and results.
The chapter will show that extraterritoriality facilitates the transition from a “unilateral” to a “multilateral” enforcement regime. This is achieved, for instance, by allowing prosecutors of one country to target foreign corporations and thereby incentivizing the enforcement of the law in home countries of those corporations. Furthermore, to resolve collective action problems, extraterritoriality should also ensure cooperation and coordination of national enforcement authorities. As to what extent extraterritoriality contributes, this chapter explains how legal institutions accompanying extraterritorial enforcement make a difference between more and less effective solutions to collective action problems. As the OECD anti-bribery enforcement regime moves from its unilateral form to a multilateral form, the institutional needs of this regime are in transition into a stronger external system of governance.
