ABSTRACT
W. V. O. Quine is often characterized as the great critic of logical positivism – the locus classicus of this critique is ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’. The ‘two dogmas’ of the title refer, first, to the analytic/synthetic distinction, and second, to the atomistic conception of empirical confirmation. The basic metaphysical principle standing behind Quine’s assault on the notion of meaning is the need for criteria of identity. Synonymy is linked to meaning, but synonymy is also linked to analyticity. This is because one traditional way of thinking of an analytic truth is that it is an instance of a logical truth. This chapter explores the two different conceptions of synonymy: definition and substitution. Explication is a kind of definition whereby one refines, revises, or improves the meaning of the term to be defined by another term that is intended to do the refining.
