ABSTRACT
The general problem addressed in the rule-following sections of Philosophical Investigations is the problem of understanding word-meaning in terms of rules that are followed by language users. Ludwig Wittgenstein’s conclusion is that if meaning is understood in this way, then meaning is indeterminate. His argument can be explained as follows: rules have no determinate content in themselves; they require interpretation, or application, or use, to gain whatever meaning they have. Saul Kripke thinks Wittgenstein canvases three possible candidates that could constitute the fact in virtue of which one’s terms have determinate meanings: algorithms, dispositions, and introspective states. For Wittgenstein and Kripke, the meaning of a term involves a normative dimension, which can be variously expressed as follows: meaning lays out which uses are correct/incorrect, it determines how a term ought/ought not to be used, which uses of a term are justified given its meaning and which are not.
