ABSTRACT
In ‘On Denoting’, Bertrand Russell provides an account of the meaning of singular terms or definite descriptions that eliminates Gottlob Frege’s notion of sense. The scope of Russell’s theory is denoting phrases in general: singular terms, indefinite descriptions, proper names, genitive phrases, and certain subordinate clauses. Russell’s strategy is to give a theory of meaning for these denoting phrases, which eliminates any impression that they mean in virtue of picking out, or standing for, a unique, particular individual. The theory of descriptions is a paradigm of logical analysis in action and showcases its perceived virtues – namely, it allows to disabuse ourselves of illusions promoted by the surface grammar of natural language. The chapter shows that a key feature of Russell’s account is that it is a ‘disappearance theory’ of definite descriptions, that it eliminates the impression that there are singular referring expressions whose semantic function is to pick out unique particular individuals which are their meanings.
