ABSTRACT
Kant seems to take it as evident that good will, either good will 1 or good will 2 or both, is of greater value than any of the possible ends of will. Kant seems on the whole, in the Groundwork at least, to obscure the difference between theoretical and practical reason by his over-emphasis of the point about the “value of mere will”. The extraordinary emphasis which Kant puts upon the good but possibly unsuccessful will, the constant reiteration of the gnomic notion of the unconditioned, have something to do with the misunderstandings to which Kant has been subject. Kant’s insistence comes in the end to be on will’s merit predominantly, and “good will” in its primitive sense is seen as a starting-point rather than as an end point. Both Kant and James Harris feel that they must meet suspicions of fantasticality. Harris is the more tender, and Kant the more resolute.
