ABSTRACT
In this chapter, the author argues that relative notions provide one with knowledge by description and that one’s relative notion of a mind, of an operation of a mind, or of a relation among ideas succeeds in singling out a mind, an act, or a relation just in case the contextual definition of its corresponding definite description is true. He shows that Berkeleian notions are to be construed as intentional acts. Focusing primarily upon Harry M. Bracken’s several defenses of this thesis, the author also argues that to construe a notion as a concept is either inconsistent with his ontological presuppositions or uninformative. He examines the positive evidence for contending that a notion is an intentional act. The author explores the relationship between George Berkeley’s doctrine of notions and his theory of idea. Some scholars have looked beyond the Berkeleian corpus in their attempts to elucidate Berkeley’s doctrine of notions.
