ABSTRACT
In discussing the implications for India of shifts in the priorities of the Trump and Abe administrations with respect to the South China Sea conundrum, the chapter conducts its analysis in the context of the US National Security Strategy (December 2017), National Defense Strategy (January 2018) and Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy. President Trump’s strategies uphold a Free and Open Indo-Pacific as a vehicle for countering a “repressive” vision of the world order with an alternative “free” vision of the world order. The dovetailing of Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy (unveiled by Shinzo Abe in August 2016) with India’s Act East policy unlocks the possibility of enhancing bilateral maritime cooperation, as well as improving connectivity in the wider Indo-Pacific region, strengthening collaboration with ASEAN and bolstering exchanges about expanding maritime domain awareness. Therefore, as India, the US and Japan are intent on reviving what Acheson called the “situation of strength” with like-minded nations in the Indo-Pacific, with the Act East and Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategies acting as bridge-builders, the chapter argues that New Delhi is poised to attain a niche in the evolving regional strategic calculus.
