ABSTRACT
To situate Kant’s a priori psychologism in relation to the conceptual landscape with which contemporary philosophers and scientists of mind operate requires its expansion to include a place for a physicalism that nevertheless treats consciousness as essential to intelligence. What leads so many to separate the question of consciousness from that of intelligence is the tendency to conceive the former in purely subjective terms of qualia, feeling, emotion, wakefulness, volitional autonomy, and similar such features that contrast sharply with objective cognitive intelligence of the kind epitomized by logic, computation, and applied mathematics. The chapter sketches the case developed in detail in Part II (Chapters 6–10) that Kant’s a priori psychologism necessitates a reconceptualization of consciousness and its subjectivity so radical and transformative as to render logic and mathematics emblematic expressions of consciousness and the quintessentially subjective. Subjects/authors discussed include physicalism, antiphysicalism, idealism, dualism, panpsychism, qualia, time-consciousness, self-consciousness, nativism, psychology, blank slate empiricism, neural plasticity, vision, mathematical logic, non-Euclidean geometry, relativity theory, quantum theory, conventionalism, platonism, Frege, Wittgenstein, William James, Christof Koch, Stuart A. Kauffman, John O’Keefe, and Lawrence Krauss.
