ABSTRACT
Counter-intelligence and counter-espionage operations were carried out by a state entity, the gonganbu. The slow restoration of normality after 1976 coincided with a gradual opening up to the outside world, which had begun with United States (US) President Richard Nixon’s 1972 visit to Beijing and the establishment of a Sino-American alliance against the Soviet Union. Countries’ intelligence services differ little in structure. What separates them is operational culture and ethos, together with factors such as the prestige accorded to intelligence work within a particular political culture. China’s intelligence services have proven particularly adept at exploiting the ambiguities in US legislation on espionage and the transmission of classified materials – the latter not a criminal offence in itself. China has been the staging area for not only a series of high-end attacks, but also many less advanced exploitation operations, characterised by those on the receiving end as noisy and reduplicative.
