ABSTRACT
This chapter deals with a brief review of developments that appear to undermine the efficacy of the IDF's traditional offensive doctrine. It examines the basic tenets of the military doctrine in light of these developments as well as the experience accumulated in implementing the Israeli military doctrine in past Arab-Israeli wars. In practice, however, assuring a close fit between a state's military doctrine and its grand strategy and overall strategic conditions is a truly demanding task. Significant political and military difficulties in implementing the IDF's traditional doctrine already became apparent in the course of the Yom Kippur War, the ultimate Israeli military victory notwithstanding. The new Arab doctrine put the emphasis on an integrated, multi-layered array of defensive lines, replete with anti-tank barriers, fortifications and obstacles, in order to reduce the maneuverability of Israeli armor on land. Geostrategic and political conditions in pre-1967 Israel indeed suggested an offensive doctrine for the IDF.
