ABSTRACT
A set of overlapping collective identities first makes “national” identity possible; indeed, the rise of the nation-state is a fairly recent phenomenon in historical terms. De jure unification, for better or worse, was based on an erroneous conflation of Volk—Nation—Citizenship—Identity. Feminists’ inability to pursue a positive German identity of their own stemmed from a reluctance to address questions of personal-as-political responsibility vis-a-vis the generation of their mothers. Many newly enfranchised Easterners resent the orientation that West German political culture comprises the mainstream, reducing their own public and private norms to a marginal force slated for extinction. One feature consistently distinguishing the two Germanys from their respective alliance partners between 1949 and 1989 was the never-ending overlap of their “domestic” and “foreign” security concerns. Though most welcomed the “liberation” of East Germany in 1989, few West Germans were ready, willing or able to assume the burdens of national unity placed upon them by way of elite-driven “power politics.”
