ABSTRACT
After the end of the draft in January 1973, the number of Reserve enlisted personnel declined precipitously for 4 successive years. The decline, from a high of 919,000 in fiscal year (FY) 1973 to a low of 788,000 by FY 1978, was due almost entirely to the decline in the Army components (Army Selected Reserve and Army National Guard), and raised serious concerns about the viability of the Army Selected Reserve in the All-Volunteer Force (AVF). One hypothesis about the decline was that pay increases--the principal mechanism recommended by the Gates Commission to sustain the AVF-were not having their predicted effect for the Reserves. The Reserves found their transition to the AVF complicated by the absence of research 1 on the effects of pay increases on enlistment and retention in the Reserves and the absence of accurate estimates of the natural rise in retention rates as a resu1t of the presence of volunteer rather than draft-motivated enlistees. Partly because of these research gaps, the Gates Commission did not tailor separate policies for the Active and Reserve forces in the AVF. Instead, they pointed out that Reserve initiatives to recruit and retain personnel may well be inadequate and additional pay increases may be necessary. 2
This paper reports on retention and attrition research subsequently undertaken to help fill this gap. The research reported here draws on two disparate analyses. The first is an evaluation of the 1978 Selected Reserve Reenlistment Bonus Test undertaken in response to a 1977 congressional authorization. This test focuses on the influence of pay and other factors on the Reserve reenlistment decision. The second analysis relates to attrition behavior of nonprior service reservists (that is, personnel who had not served in the Active force before joining the Reserve) who separate from the Reserves before they complete their enlisted term. The Gates Commission failed to anticipate the rise in first-term attrition during the AVF for both the Active force and the Reserves. This increase in attrition raised accession requirements. Recognition of this effect would probably have resulted in a recommendation to increase levels of pay beyond the increases originally recommended; this action might have forestalled some of the decline.
