ABSTRACT
The idea to upgrade cooperation with Israel — albeit in a much more discreet fashion — had originated earlier as an element of Secretary Haig’s version of the administration’s design for the regional strategic network. By the time of the unceremonial signing and precipitous suspension of the Understanding for Strategic Cooperation, it appeared as though the Strategic Consensus approach had already been adopted as an administration-wide policy. The Iran-Iraq war contributed considerably to US strategic cooperation with at least one reluctant group: the Arab littorals of the Persian Gulf. Traumatized by the vision of a victorious Shi’a Iran sending Islamic revolutionary shock waves through their own Shi’a minorities, and no longer concerned with Iraq’s veto, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates joined bolder Oman in a regional Gulf Cooperation Council. The work of the two teams within the Joint Political and Military Group attracted public attention only once, with a mid-July 1984 joint medical exercise.
