ABSTRACT
Three aspects of the Lebanese crisis dominated the month of June 1958. The first was the presence of United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon forces. The second was the increasing control of the country won by the opposition in its military-political actions; and the third was the latest phase in the Eisenhower-Dulles ruminations on what was to be done, while continuing to send Sham'un support short of full-scale military intervention. Regime losses were reported from Beirut in blunt accounts by US military sources that left no doubts as to the utter weakness of the regime, as well as its exaggerated claims. Within the first two weeks of June, John Foster Dulles and Eisenhower were faced with renewed requests for military assistance from Sham'un to cope with the situation. In Washington Central Intelligence Agency analysts argued against the view that Nasserism and Arab nationalism were expressions of Soviet manipulation or that Arab nationalism was antithetical to US interests.
