ABSTRACT
This chapter describes the Soviet and French responses to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) decision to deploy American Euromissiles. It considers the Soviet and French positions and analyzes their diverging interests in the Euromissile crisis. The Soviets are especially concerned to protect their Eurostrategic capability, for Western nuclear systems potentially enable the Soviets to neutralize NATO nuclear forces in the event of hostilities. The Soviets have been anxious to appear willing to negotiate, in part as a propaganda weapon in the struggle for public opinion in the West, and in order to prevent or to delay significantly the US Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) deployment. During November 1981, American and Soviet leaders made public proposals for the reduction of INFs, which were based on very different assessments of the INF balance. The concerns expressed by Guehenno have been widely shared throughout the French government in the 1970s and 1980s and have shaped French responses to the Euromissile crisis.
