ABSTRACT
Analyzing the part that France might play in conventional contingencies in Central Europe would at first glance appear to be an artificial and unrewarding exercise. Soviet nuclear capabilities at all levels have been improved, partly in order to undermine the credibility of potential American nuclear responses to Warsaw Pact conventional aggression. In addition to changing threat assessments, recognition of need to have more usable and less self-defeating military options, nuclear and conventional, has prompted greater interest in improved conventional capabilities. France's potential contributions to conventional contingencies are more important than in the past, when allies were more satisfied to rely primarily on threats of US nuclear escalation to deter Soviet aggression and to neutralize Soviet blackmail pressures. Conventional naval threats to European security, including growing Soviet abilities to impede the supply by sea of West European economies and NATO forces, are neglected in these proposals, even though the French navy could be an important asset in countering Soviet naval power.
