ABSTRACT
The architects of the post-World War II international economic institutions had intended the so-called Bretton Woods twins, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, to be complemented by the International Trade Organization. Thus industrialized countries, with their greater power in the IMF and the World Bank under the weighted voting system, could leverage that power to "punish" developing countries if they violate the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement. The IMF and the World Bank differ from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and the WTO, in two crucial respects. First, they both have resources to lend and thus some leverage in imposing conditionality. Second, in their weighted system of voting, with the industrialized countries having the largest weight in their decision-making, the influence of developing countries is limited. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade tradition has been one of consensus in decisionmaking, although formally, a majority can decide with each member having one vote.
