ABSTRACT
The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation Conference attacked the problems of national and subnational diversion from another angle. The International Nuclear Reviews (INR) would apply Lilienthal's embargo on a selective basis with international legitimacy. Each of the INRs can be evaluated by various criteria, but certainly desirability and attainability are among the most important. The logic of Albert Wohlstetter argument suggests that one of the consequences of the INRs' activity might be to induce states to manufacture their own civil nuclear facilities, rather than import them, as the guise for a weapons program. However, many exporters are themselves importers of some nuclear technologies and would therefore fall under INR scrutiny. Thus, the idea of also developing an international agreed-upon, overall concept for nuclear safety merits consideration. Nations would have to agree to greater international scrutiny of their nuclear programs, but the cost is nominal compared to the consequences of a nuclear incident.
