This chapter reviews the first century plus of Bolivian civil-military relations, during which the armed forces edged toward institutional coherence and the dominance of the upper class in politics was increasingly contested. It examines the post-Chaco War period, with particular attention to the consequences of the 1952 revolution on the armed forces. The chapter explores the economic and social obstacles that impede successful long-term military disengagement from politics in Bolivia. "Military socialism" entailed a spasmodic, partial, institutional involvement of the armed forces in politics, under the impetus of officers hostile to the oligarchy and its supporters, but also reluctant to encourage major participation by workers and peasants that might undo the special position of the armed forces. The political involvement of the Bolivian military since 1936 has been episodic rather than continuous. The 1953 decree reorganizing the armed forces pointed to an important theme in Bolivian civil-military relations following the revolution: the armed forces' role in economic development.