ABSTRACT
Immanuel Kant’s theory of moral motivation is grounded in a fundamental theme of all three Critiques, namely, the distinction between the sensible and the rational and the problematic a priori connection that he thinks obtains between them. In order to establish this connection, he relies upon the related distinction between the a priori and empirical elements of sensibility itself. Neo-Kantian work, from Thomas Nagel’s seminal work onward, has tried to show how implausible it is to think that all human action must conform to the empiricist dogma. The neo-Kantian objections against the empiricist orthodoxy affect Kant’s view of the natural standpoint inasmuch as the standpoint assumes the orthodoxy. The only orthodoxy in empiricism is that everything is hostage to experience or observation, someone might say. Furthermore, Kant is thoroughly modern in extending the scope of sensibility to include the unconscious.
