ABSTRACT
The Argentine Air Force pursued the development of the nuclear-capable Condor II medium-range ballistic missile, and Argentina’s aggressive nuclear export policy sometimes resulted in questionable nuclear transfers. The risk that Argentina might develop nuclear arms diminished significantly when Raul Alfonsín was elected president in November 1983, following seven years of military rule. The project was under the control of the Argentine Air Force, the only branch of the armed services whose reputation was relatively unsullied by Argentina’s defeat in the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War. Argentina’s domestic preoccupations have tended to displace concerns of years past about nuclear developments in Brazil. The most widely accepted mechanism for verifying the status of nuclear installations are International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, which would need to be applied to all nuclear activities in Argentina and Brazil to be useful under current circumstances. The bilateral visits two states have adopted are not comparable to IAEA inspections, given the seemingly ad hoc nature of the exchanges.
