ABSTRACT
The experiences of Argentina during the mid-1980s illustrates how a nation can use its excessive indebtedness to advantage in certain negotiating situations, it also illustrates the capacity of the managing director of the Fund to circumvent the executive board through direct intervention in the negotiating process. By 1985, however, economic conditions in Argentina had deteriorated to a crisis point and the Raul Alfonsin administration made a dramatic break with populist policies. In the case of Argentina, however, in order to counteract the significant public relations efforts of the government, Fund leaders began making their tactics and strategy public knowledge. The Executive Board played a relatively passive role throughout the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) negotiations with Argentina. Overall, the international bankers had leverage with Argentina roughly proportional to the IMF itself. Bankers were more concerned about quarterly reports than long-term solutions. Argentina showed far more resolve during the period than did the bankers.
