ABSTRACT
In the first few years after Second World War, there was more progress made on establishing international economic institutions than on security arrangements. For purposes of analyzing the evolution of Deterrence doctrine, it is useful to divide the post-Second World War era into four periods of distinctly different United States strategy: 1945-52, 1953-60, 1961-73, and 1974 - present. In the United States since the mid-1960s, there has been very close cooperation between military specialists who support Deterrence and groups favoring arms control. Despite President Hoover's support and the considerable effort devoted to negotiating the London Naval Agreements of 1922 and 1936, there is now a fair consensus among historians that these efforts were neither particularly effective in their own right nor significant in altering the drift toward Second World War. Ken Adelman has stated that arms control negotiations consume vast amounts of time of top policy-makers "with little or no relevance to keeping the peace or strengthening the nation".
