ABSTRACT
Assessments by Western observers of the East German reaction to the West German-Soviet treaty of 12 August 1970 vary - but only in the degree of negativism imputed to the East German leaders’ response. In fact the Moscow treaty itself forms only one part of the agreement between the Soviet Union and West Germany. Bearing in mind East German pronouncements during the summer, the reaction to the signing and publication of the Moscow treaty appears remarkably consistent. Ulbricht‘s official policy on Berlin, predictably enough, was meeting with little success, if indeed it was intended primarily for Western consumption. Soviet withdrawal of support had led ultimately to defeat of various challenges to Ulbricht’s leadership in the 1950s. From the Soviet, and particularly the East German point of view, the Berlin agreement brought less tangible benefits. Such a conclusion would be a logical extension of the assumptions outlined earlier with respect to East German, and particularly Ulbricht’s dependency on the Soviet Union.
