ABSTRACT
This chapter addresses the second research question, which focuses on the delivery and utilization of US aid in Pakistan within the framework of the 2005 Paris Declaration (PD) on Aid Effectiveness. In this way, it brings together the earlier chapters, which examined both US aid flows to Pakistan and the emergence of the aid-effectiveness discourse in the form of the PD, alongside the GoP aid-effectiveness architecture. Here, the aim is to examine the approaches and processes of both the GoP and USAID in relation to the selection, design and execution of development projects within the aid-effectiveness paradigm. To this end, the respective roles of different ministries and departments of the GoP and the role of USAID are examined within the parameters of the five principles committed to under the Paris accord. The first section provides an overview of the role of the GoP in donor-funded projects. It reveals whether it is the government and its different ministries and departments that have a central role in aid decision-making or whether it is the donor agencies that are at the forefront regarding aid-allocation priorities and choices. The chapter then examines USAID interventions in Pakistan from the perspective of the five PD commitments. Keeping the aid-effectiveness agenda central, it investigates the role of the Economic Affairs Division (EAD), the key ministry of the federal government responsible for dealing with external aid donors, and that of USAID in the selection, planning and implementation of development projects. The modus operandi of USAID is further explored at the implementation level in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). This is done by examining USAID interventions, focusing on aspects such as who had ownership, to what extent projects were aligned with the country needs and systems, and whether there was harmonization between the US and other donors. The developmental role of US aid in Pakistan as well as the concept of mutual accountability, the last two of the five PD prerequisites for aid effectiveness, also form part of the discussion. In addition, the role of USAID in three recent humanitarian crises in Pakistan is assessed, where the US was the largest aid provider. In doing so, the overall findings also refute the common perception held and propagated by many in Pakistan that most US aid has been least effective and that it has not delivered any development results. Contrary to popular perceptions about the insignificance of US aid or its ineffectiveness in achieving tangible development outcomes, this chapter illustrates that the developmental role of US aid in Pakistan has been rarely explored. Based mostly on primary findings and also complemented by secondary data, this chapter posits that although the US is not a popular donor in Pakistan because of its overt meddling in the country’s internal affairs, the reality is that it is the largest aid provider to the country and has carried out numerous projects in various sectors, including health, education, energy and post-conflict and post-disaster reconstruction. The chapter concludes with an overall summary of the findings regarding the gap between the avowed policy of both USAID and the GoP and the actual practices within the PD framework.
