ABSTRACT
This chapter examines Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s metaphysic of the self as it is propounded in the Profession de foi du Vicaire Savoyard. The Profession de foi du Vicaire Savoyard contains Rousseau’s most explicitly philosophical account of his conception of the self. The metaphysical argument in the Profession de foi has often been read as an adjunct to Rousseau’s more primary moral concern there, which is to discover the source of moral truth in the nature of the self. The nature of Emile’s freedom and the obstacles to its realization both have their roots in Rousseau’s conception of the self. The moral argument of the Profession de foi is firmly within the modern individualist tradition. It is also consistent with Rousseau’s moral theory in the rest of Emile. The conception of freedom developed in the Profession de foi is important, because it derives directly from Rousseau’s conception of the self, and therefore makes the epistemological basis of his moral theory explicit.
