ABSTRACT
A scholarly consensus has emerged that David Hume’s primary intentions were constructive. His aim was to develop a Science of Man through introducing “the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects.” In particular, many of Hume’s naturalistic interpreters undervalue the skeptical dimensions of his position, for once it is decided that Hume’s aim was not to unfold the skeptical consequences of British Empiricism; skepticism itself is given low priority in the general interpretation of Hume’s philosophy. The Treatise is packed with skeptical arguments. Notice from the start that the degree of Hume’s skeptical commitment is variable – and, as see, there are good reasons for this. This moderate – probabilistic, academic – skepticism raises few problems for the general interpretation of Hume’s philosophy; indeed, it complements Hume’s overall naturalistic program. But in his closet, Hume traffics in a more radical version of skepticism that is Pyrrhonian rather than Carneadean.
