ABSTRACT
A fundamental objection to this claim is that David Hume’s skepticism has nothing to do with his naturalistic program. To confound the two is to miscast philosophical issues as matters of empirical psychology. The Humean skeptic philosophizes because under certain conditions he is compelled to do so. The reverse problem, the seeming tendency of Hume’s naturalism to undercut all epistemic assessments, hence his skepticism as well, admits of a similar rejoinder. In the Treatise Hume constantly furthers certain philosophical views while criticizing others, yet, on his own account, all these views are natural products of the mind’s operations. For Hume there are no arguments that will refute Pyrrhonism, and that entails that there can be no arguments justifying a more mitigated version of skepticism. The mitigated skepticism that Hume recommends is the causal product of two competing influences: Pyrrhonian doubt on one side, natural instinct on the other.
