ABSTRACT
The subject of this chapter is the common premise underlying Schleiermacher’s partial rejection of the Augustinian deficient cause tradition of the origins of sin: a strong version of the principle of sufficient reason. It begins by examining Augustine’s account of deficient causes, especially of the evil will, and hence of sin. It then contrasts the account of agency and causality presupposed in Augustine’s account with that given by Schleiermacher. Schleiermacher, it is shown, thinks that sin is a determined failure – that is, a deficiency with efficient causes sufficient to bring such a deficiency about. Next it is shown that Schleiermacher thought that he had warrant, and even obligation, to give such an account because of his most basic commitment to the uniqueness of God as that upon which all depend absolutely, not just for their being but also for their acts. Finally, Schleiermacher’s conception of freedom and determination is reconsidered in light of the foregoing claims and evidence.
