ABSTRACT
This chapter examines Schleiermacher’s account of what sin is, with an eye to relating Schleiermacher’s technical language to the broader tradition. What becomes clear is that Schleiermacher gives an account of sin which is, despite what has been seen in previous chapters, recognizably Augustinian in the sense that sin consists in a disordering of loves (i.e., basic desires) which alienates humans from God and deprives them of their ultimate happiness. This chapter also explores in detail how Schleiermacher understands the way sin comes to bear on the intellect and will and, therefore, how it comes to determine particular sinful acts. Schleiermacher advances a classical account of akrasia, or weakness of the will, to explain how a state of disordered loves inevitably issues in sinful action. The chapter concludes by connecting individual sin to social sin and shows that, for Schleiermacher, both have causes sufficient to determine sinners as sinners, as well as to determine sinners to sinful acts. Social sin is no exception to Schleiermacher’s application of the principle of sufficient reason, and social sin is, itself, grounded in sinful human nature.
