ABSTRACT
If Chapter 3 identifies one impediment to historical understanding in respect of paintings—failure to define them adequately as a kind (or a subset thereof)—this chapter discusses a second: the characterization of the painter as an artist of genius. It appeals to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s reservations concerning European ideas of genius. His remarks suggest that conceiving of human-made things in terms of genius not only detracts from viewers’ abilities to evaluate and explain paintings, but that anyone who acquiesces in claims of genius when using paintings as historical evidence will likely miss the point of the things to which they appeal (always allowing for the looping effect of those who claimed genius on their own behalves, and acted accordingly). This chapter argues that ingenuity has wider applicability culturally and chronologically than genius, so might help inquirers to transcend local notions concerning the making and use of paintings, bringing them closer to a conceptual understanding. This chapter suggests that a concept of ingenuity that does not mask the skill of painters, both physical and intellectual, would serve anyone interested in using paintings to elucidate the past more effectively. The case study appeals to the reputation of Rembrandt van Rijn in the progressive application of claims of genius from the eighteenth century to the present, and its obfuscating effect on any possible historical understanding of his works. This chapter refers to scholars Aristotle, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Nietzsche, Arthur Schopenhauer, Friedrich Schiller, Ludwig Wittgenstein; and artists Rembrandt van Rijn and Giorgio Vasari.
