ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses in further depth some of the most distinctive extrajudicial practice of the SPC in its everyday operation. It should come as no surprise that supreme court judges serve more functions than simply that of adjudicators, and the SPC is linked to broader roles than being the court of last resort. Evidence presented in this chapter suggests that the SPC in many respects operates in a manner consistent with how the rest of the bureaucracy is run, which can be reflected in its approaches to strengthening administrative management within the judicial hierarchy and its active engagement in complying with the political agenda of the Party-state. Despite that the SPC has been increasingly characterized as a pragmatic actor with greater professionalization in judicial practice, its institutional independence and functional autonomy as reflected in extrajudicial practice are rather limited. In fact, the institutional dependence of the judiciary has greatly increased the risk of the SPC being beholden to external political and economic pressures when confronted with conflicts among adjudicative, administrative, and political functions. This chapter further highlights that the judicial and extrajudicial functions of the SPC are not totally separate, stand-alone practice but rather intertwined and at times constraining of one another. Thus, an imminent dilemma before the SPC rests upon how to strike a balance between legal rationality and political missions in the development of the law.
