ABSTRACT
The main question of this chapter is: Could our failure to make a commitment to do something about climate change, which entails our failure to develop the required agential capabilities and institutional policies and strategies, be seen as a form of moral corruption? Stephen Gardiner’s definition of the concept of moral corruption is outlined, and it is proposed to reformulate it, inspired by Kant’s account of “radical evil”. It is argued that moral corruption is a self-deceptive form of trying to maintain one’s convenient status quo. If, however, human beings, en masse, were to display morally corrupt agency, then what would be the effect of such agency on us? This kind of agency forms an impediment to our agential capabilities as we exercise them every day, for example in leadership roles in organisations. Equally important, however, is the question how we should understand our moral integrity should we fail to take up Humanity’s Challenge but choose instead morally corrupt agency. If we aim to possess the virtue of integrity, we not only have the moral motive for preserving the planet for future generations, but we also have the indirect motive for making a commitment to take sustainable action. This chapter considers the nature of that commitment.
