ABSTRACT
The agent who has passed beyond the phase of deliberation is also confronted in the commitment phase with specific motivational hurdles. Making a commitment means facing the existential question: Am I prepared to do or refrain from doing certain things in order to help mitigate climate change, even though my actions will primarily benefit people who will live in the distant future? In order to clarify the motivational features of acting sustainably, two philosophical theories are used in interpreting the case material: Michael Bratman’s intrasubjective theory of intention, since the forming of intentions is among the first signs of an agent’s commitment, and Axel Honneth’s intersubjective theory of recognition, since making commitments leads to changes in one’s social relations with other agents. The key questions about intentions are: How strong do the agent’s intentions need to be, if we consider their internal consistency and means-end coherence? And, to what extent must the agent believe that she will be effective during the execution phase? The analysis of intersubjective recognition, as developed in this chapter, serves to highlight the complex connections between diminished self-esteem and self-respect and the public expression of one’s commitment to sustainable action.
