ABSTRACT
The psychological operations program is the least understood, the most difficult to explain, and surely the hardest to measure of any of our efforts in Vietnam. The Americans working in Joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) and Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) had a rather clear view of their own success and failure in the effort "to prevent communist domination of South Vietnam" and "to create a viable and increasingly democratic society." On the military side of the war, the morale of the Viet Cong and Northern troops remained relatively high throughout the conflict, despite enormous manpower and equipment losses. South Vietnamese propagandists could have received more training and experience if JUSPAO, MACV, and Civil Operations and Rural Development Support Agency had truly been advisors, rather than a huge production agency. Marxist-Leninist doctrine concerning "Wars of National Liberation" provided the basic blueprint for final reunification of Vietnam.
