ABSTRACT
The formulation of nuclear nonproliferation policy in the US Examining the case of nuclear non-proliferation policy will help to illustrate the characteristics of interbranch relations on strategic-nonsalient issues. In contrast to arms sales to the Middle East or most-favored-nation trade status, nuclear non-proliferation policy illustrates a case conducive to only moderate or occasional conflict between the executive and legislative branches. Given the serious potential for international instability born of uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear materials and technology, coupled with Congress' constitutional role in regulating trade with other countries, the institutional incentive for congressional involvement is clear. Nuclear non-proliferation policy presents a case in which there is an institutional motivation for Congress to get involved but less individual motivation. The Chadha decision, therefore, did affect the ability of Congress to impact US nuclear non-proliferation policy, but the impact was dulled by the fact that congressional will to use the statutory tool was weak.
