ABSTRACT
The introductory section presents the organization and the rationale of this book, building the broader research design and the ontological and epistemological foundation to support the conceptual argument based on the security dilemma. This section introduces the set of research questions and central argument in order to carefully monitor how evolving competing strategies between the US (the dominant player), China (the regional rising power), and India (the regional aspirant power) within the realm of the security dilemma could gradually affect the cooperation level between these competing states, in general, and the South Asian deterrence stability between India and Pakistan, in particular. Because of the introduction of new cutting-edge, but sophisticated technologies in terms of deterrent forces expansion in South Asia, this chapter intends to refresh the imperatives of the classic security dilemma when South Asian nuclear states locate themselves in the broader vicious circle of the leading powers’ competing strategies in the Asian region. Based on the central rationale, the chapter attempts to justify the timely relevance and significance of this study, thereby situating it in the existing literature and, giving it exceptional impetus and academic rigor to further expand the academic debate on the subject.
