ABSTRACT
In this concluding chapter, I summarize the findings that shed light on the overall structure of the anti-Islamic far right and its entanglement with liberal and progressive values. Having distinguished between the anti-Islamic expansion of the far right with new initiatives and the anti-Islamic reorientation of pre-existing radical right parties, I argue that the initiatives that make up the anti-Islamic expansion of the far right comprise a transnational movement embedded in a broader subculture. This movement and subculture has a consistent worldview and prominent ideologues. Furthermore, it is characterized by a semi-liberal equilibrium – which is evident in their official ideology and online organizational networks, and among their online members. Rather than starting from a nativist and authoritarian position, the anti-Islamic movement is composed of liberals who have gradually drifted in a far right, authoritarian direction. This demonstrates that who the enemy is really does matter. The movement stands in danger of drifting in a further authoritarian, illiberal direction that would see the semi-liberal equilibrium overturned. I have identified three sources for this scenario. First, their view of Islam as an immediate and existential threat to Western civilization leaves space for more authoritarian, extreme, and explicitly illiberal solutions. Second, the movement already harbours a vocal minority of extreme activists. Third, their network expanded to Eastern Europe during the refugee crisis and now contains some explicitly extreme right groups. The extremists stand poised to exploit the movements’ ideological discrepancies if the opportunity arises.
