ABSTRACT
It is interesting to notice that, according to Martin Heidegger, Beyng is not the only destitute matter in his philosophy. Among the very many concepts and ideas which are troublesome, the Nothing seems to force him to face the same kind of issues which are, in turn, generated by Beyng. For instance, when Heidegger claims that “the Nothing is the complete negation of the totality of all entities”, Heidegger formulates a grammatical construction which seems to be a perfectly acceptable assertion about the Nothing. On the ground of Weber and Cotnoir’s paraconsistent mereology, this chapter explores a mereological theory which has the complement of the totality. It shows that, first of all, the complement of the totality has some inconsistent features and that, second, such inconsistent features can be used to describe the inconsistent account of Beyng and the Nothing.
